constitutive explanations, given that the behaviors of mechanisms as a whole and the behaviors of the parts overlap. If a view of causation is to cover cases of constitutive relevance, it will also have to abandon the common assumption that causes precede their effects, because the behavior of components occurs during the behavior of the mechanism as a whole. If a view of causation entails that causal relevance is asymmetrical, then it will be inapplicable to the relationship between components and the behavior of a mechanism as a whole. Causes produce their effects, and (at least in many cases) not vice versa. The relationship between a component and the behavior of a mechanism as a whole is always symetrical.
Finally, if one views causation as a relationship of manipulability, then modularity constraints and restrictions on experimental interventions might be thought to prevent one from thinking of the interlevel relationship causally. One cannot, for example, intervene to change the value of the whole without thereby changing the value of the components. (Later, I show how this can be understood without violating this constraint on interventions.)
The Chicago school has thus far said very little about explanatory relevance and nothing about constitutive relevance. Stuart Glennan (2002) argues, picking up on a suggestion from Woodward (2002) , that the etiological relevance of one property or component of a mechanism to another can be understood usefully (although not reductively) in terms of the ability to manipulate one component by intervening on another. One cannot control storms by breaking barometers. One cannot increase Jones' chances of getting pregnant by replacing his birth control pills with placebos. And (at least in many cases) one cannot change the past by intervening in the present. This manipulationist view is promising in part because it so readily diagnoses and dispenses with these classic problems. That is progress. But Glennan, Woodward and the rest of the mechanists thus far continue Salmon's tradition of neglect for constitutive relevance. I will ultimately argue for a manipulationist view of interlevel relevance.
This problem is not unique to causal-mechanical views of explanation. Examples such as the barometer and the storm and Jones' birth-control pills have analogues that raise problems for constitutive covering-law explanations. Classical reduction, in which a revised and restricted reduced theory is derived from a reducing theory with the aid of bridge laws connecting the kind-terms in the two theories, is the covering law's view of constitutive explanation (see Schaffner 1993) . There are spurious derivations that any adequate account must rule out.
First, the behavior of a mechanism as a whole might be merely correlated with some activity or behavior of a part. This can happen when the activity or behavior of a part is caused or otherwise modulated by activities in the mechanism (analogously to the barometer and the storm). For example, functional imaging techniques work because changes in blood flow regularly follow changes in neural activity. Changes in blood flow are, so far as we know, not part of the mechanism. Rather, they are correlates that can be used as indicators. One could in some cases derive facts about our cognitive activities from facts about patterns in cerebral blood flow, but this would not count as an explanation. The blood flow changes are irrelevant. They are sterile effects.
Second, covering law explanations are arguments, and irrelevant premises do not affect the strength of an argument. But, as Salmon notes, irrelevant information is deadly for explanations. (This is analogous to the point made by Jones' birth-control pills). Assuming that one could derive that a cell would induce LTP from statements about its molecular constituents (an assumption that receives little support from contemporary neuroscience), one could also achieve the same derivation with an additional set of statements about anything you like. Newton's laws and the Darwinian theory of evolution could be conjoined to statements about molecular constituents of cells without affecting the ability to derive features of the LTP phenomenon. Hempel and Oppenheim (in Hempel1965) raise a related problem in their famous footnote 33.
3. Relevance and the Boundaries of Mechanisms. Why do we need an account of constitutive relevance? First, an account of constitutive explanation that does not include an account of explanatory relevance cannot distinguish good explanations (that is, those that contain all and only the relevant explanatory facts) from bad explanations (that is, those that leave out relevant facts or include irrelevant facts). If the philosophy of science has a normative role to play in discussions of explanation in sciences such as biology and neuroscience, then it cannot sidestep the problem of constitutive relevance.
Second, without a view of constitutive relevance, the mechanistic approach to explanation threatens to collapse back into the covering-law model. For what can it mean for the organized activities of components to exhibit (or account for) the behavior of the mechanism as a whole if not that one can derive (or otherwise infer) a description of the latter from a description of the former? A view of constitutive relevance can, I believe, elucidate the sense in which a mechanism accounts for its phenomenon without abandoning the general commitment to the causal-mechanical view of explanation.
Third, the very idea of a mechanism presupposes the idea of constitutive relevance. To see why, consider one important difference between mechanisms and machines. Machines typically contain parts and have properties that are not in their mechanisms. The hubcaps, the mud-flaps, the windshield, and the fuzzy dice are all parts of a fine automobile, but they are not parts of the mechanism that makes it run. They are not relevant to the running behavior of the car, It would therefore be a mistake to include them in the mechanism for the car's running. This difference between mechanisms and machines turns at least in part on the fact that all of the constituents of a mechanism are relevant to what it does (they are components), while only some of the parts of machines are relevant to what they do (namely, those that are components in one or more of its mechanisms).
This point is closely related to one made by Stuart Kauffman (1971) in a core article for Chicago mechanism. Kauffman argues that there are many ways to break a machine or organism into parts depending upon one's perspective on the system. First, one accentuates or neglects different constituents of the machine or organism depending on which explanandum phenomenon one sets out to explain. To explain the blood's circulation, we focus on valves, arteries, and hearts, and we neglect adipose tissue, intestines and toenails. To explain respiration, we focus on lungs and diaphragms, but we neglect the venous valves. Second, in focusing on different explanandum phenomena one will cut the organism (or Second, the fact that mechanisms such as the mechanism of protein synthesis are contained does not show that the container defines (rather than merely correlates with) the boundaries of the mechanism.
One can take the protein synthesis mechanism out of the nucleus and allow it to work in a cell-free medium. This fact, which was crucial to the discovery of the mechanism of protein synthesis, shows that the compartment can be removed from many mechanisms without altering the mechanism's behavior at all: all of the relevant parts are still in place. Of course, it is trivially true that all material mechanisms can be circumscribed within a spatial boundary or contained within a physical boundary, but the problem is to state a rule (or short of that, some normative guidelines) for deciding where that physical or spatial boundary should be drawn if it is to include all and only the components in a mechanism.
Cartesian mechanists also worried about how to define the boundaries of mechanisms (see Des Chenne 2001). Descartes at times favors principles of spatial organization: the parts of machines move together; they can be transported together from one place to another while maintaining fixed relative positions. Some late Cartesians require that the parts of the machine must be in physical contact with one another. Few contemporary scientists or philosophers require that the parts of mechanisms must be physically connected. The parts of the NMDA receptor work by double-prevention. Depolarization in the post-synaptic cell releases the magnesium blockade of the channel and allows calcium to diffuse into the cell. Such causation by double-prevention cannot be understood in terms of physical connection. This fact suggests that some relevant parts of a mechanism might not be physically connected with one another. Parts of mechanisms also often move in separate directions. Magnesium moves out of the cell. Calcium moves in. Glutamate departs the presynaptic cell and diffuses to the post-synaptic cell. Nitric oxide moves in the opposite direction. Third, mechanisms are sometimes spatially ephemeral; they work only as components happen to come into the appropriate spatial arrangement. Diagrams of LTP mechanism gloss over the fact that the intracellular fluid is a witches brew of molecules and cascades, and the relevant reactions for a given mechanism or cascade could happen anywhere in the cytoplasm. Such mechanisms lack stable spatial relations. They could not be picked up and carried from one place to the next. Spatial relations are insufficient to define the boundaries of mechanisms.
Finally, one might delimit the boundaries of a mechanism by appeal to the causal interactions among the components in a mechanism. Herbert Simon (1969), for example, argues that variables are clustered into systems (which can be understood as mechanisms for present purposes) when their interactions with one another are stronger than are their interactions with variables outside of that set. Wimsatt (1976) holds that the boundaries of a mechanism are defined by the relative strengths of intra-and extra-systemic causal interactions plus a pragmatic factor for tolerance of error. Haugeland (1998) describes mechanisms as "relatively independent and self-contained composites of components interacting at interfaces" (215). By "relatively independent and self-contained" he means that they interact more often and more intimately with items inside the interfaces than with those outside (215). Grush suggests a plugand-play criterion, according to which components are those that can be taken out of the mechanism and replaced with functional equivalents. Second, the criterion of strength of interaction faces the challenge of ruling out sterile effects. The influx of calcium into the post-synaptic cell changes the calcium concentration in the witches brew, thereby affecting every intracellular signaling mechanism that shares calcium levels as a rate-limiting step (a fact that makes the coordinated working of biochemical mechanisms seem miraculous at times). NMDA receptors exert a host of attractive and repulsive effects on ions and other particles in the cytoplasm and in the extracellular space, they deform the membrane, and so on. But like changes in cerebral blood flow, these activities are sterile in the mechanism: they either produce no changes in the other components of the 2 Grush's (2003) view is interestingly different from the others, and I do not consider his rich suggestion in detail in this paper. Note, however, that what counts as "plug and play" depends in part on our skills as pluggers and players, and so on features of our cognitive systems rather than objective features of the world, as demanded by the ontic conception. 3 Note that these cannot be defeated by treating the termination condition of the mechanism mechanism, or the changes they do produce make no difference to LTP. In contrast, the opening of the NMDA receptor, and the movement of calcium ions are all tightly coupled in a way that does make a difference to action potentials.
To conclude, in my view, all of these approaches to defining the boundaries of mechanisms are looking for the wrong sort of criterion. The spatial and interactive boundaries of mechanisms are epistemically and ontically secondary to the delineation of relevance boundaries. The spatial boundaries sought by late Cartesians are those that circumscribe all and only the relevant entities and activities. The causal boundaries sought by Simon, Wimsatt, and Haugeland are those that circumscribe all and only the relevant causal interactions.
In fact, it is surprising that anyone could have thought otherwise. This conclusion is apparent even in the consensus definition of mechanisms: the mechanism includes the entities and activities that are organized such that they exhibit the phenomenon. There are no mechanisms simpliciter. There are only mechanisms of behaviors. The boundaries of mechanisms are drawn around all and only the entities, activities, and organizational features relevant to the behavior of the mechanism as a whole. This, it seems to me, is a step in the direction of a causal-mechanical alternative to derivability as a regulative ideal for explanation. Figure 2 shows a bottom-up experiment, in which one intervenes into a component in a mechanism (X's φ-ing) and detects changes in the behavior of the mechanism as a whole (S's ψ-ing). The right side shows a top-down experiment, in which one intervenes to manipulate the phenomenon (S's ψ-ing) and detects changes in the activities or properties of the components in the mechanism (X's φ-ing).
[ Figure 2 Near here]
This way of speaking about interlevel experiments is intended to be understood as follows: X's φ-ing is a component in S's ψ-ing. S's ψ-ing can be understood as a complex input-output relationship. The inputs include all of the relevant conditions required for S to ψ. In the case of LTP, this will include the stimulus delivered to the presynaptic cell and other conditions of the sort described in methods sections of scientific papers. The output is a potentiated synapse. Between these inputs and outputs is a mechanism, an organized collection of parts and activities. X is one of those parts, and φ is one of those activities. One intervenes on S's ψ-ing by intervening to provide the conditions sufficient for S to ψ. Top-down experiments intervene in this way. Bottom-up experiments involve intervening into the components of the intermediate mechanism. In each case, the goal is to show that X's φ-ing is causally between the inputs and outputs that constitute S's ψ-ing.
There are three common varieties of interlevel experiment: interference experiments, stimulation experiments, and activation experiments. 5 They differ depending on whether the experiment is top-down or
The crucial point is that these three experimental strategiesinterference, stimulation, and activation cannot fully be understood in isolation. These strategies are typically used together because the strengths of one strategy often compensate for the weaknesses of another.
This fact is built into my causal-mechanical approach to constitutive relevance. The close analogy between causal experiments and interlevel experiments suggests that the manipulability account of etiological relevance (developed along the lines of Woodward's 2003 account) might be extended to provide an account constitutive mechanistic relevance. My working account of constitutive relevance is as follows: a component is relevant to the behavior of a mechanism as a whole when the two are mutually manipulable that is, when one can wiggle the behavior of the whole by wiggling the behavior of the component and one can wiggle the behavior of the component by wiggling the behavior as a whole.
Somewhat more precisely, in the conditions relevant to the request for explanation, (i) there is some change to X's φ-ing that changes S's ψ-ing, and (ii) there is some change to S's ψ-ing that changes X's φ-ing. The relationship is symmetrical to reflect the fact that bottom-up and top-down experiments are mutually reinforcing in that they correct for inherent limitations in the others. (Note that this is not a supervenience or identity claim. It is a relationship between a whole and one of its parts. S's ψ-ing does not supervene on X's φing. Rather, it supervenes on the organized activities of all of the components in the mechanism.)
To begin with the bottom-up case, interference and stimulation experiments help to resolve the two worries just mentioned about activation experiments.
First, interference and stimulation studies allow one to distinguish mere correlates and sterile effects from relevant components. One cannot change the behavior of the mechanism as a whole by intervening to excite or inhibit lower-level correlates, but one can change the behavior of the mechanism as a whole by intervening to manipulate lower-level components. Performance of cognitive tasks, for example, is correlated with hemodynamic changes, but this does not mean that the hemodynamic changes are part of the mechanism involved in task performance (as all MRI researchers know). Hemodynamic changes can be ruled out as components of the mechanism on the grounds that intervening to prevent the increase in blood flow during a task will not prevent one from performing the task. Of course, preventing blood flow to a region can quickly degrade task performance, and perhaps preventing the increase in blood flow would have long-term consequences as well. However, because hemodynamic changes typically follow the performance of a task, it is safe to assume that preventing those changes cannot alter task performance. Most generally, such experiments exclude correlations from constitutive explanations because intervening to change a mere correlate will not alter the phenomenon. Knowing that one can manipulate S's ψ-ing by manipulating X's φ-ing in various ways allows one to say how S's ψ-ing is different when X is removed or when X's φ-ing is altered. In other words, a relationship that satisfies (i) allows one to answer a range of what-if-things-are-different questions about how the mechanism will behave under a variety of conditions.
Second, while top-down activation experiments are blind to tonically active parts, removing or interfering with those parts nonetheless change the behavior of the mechanism as a whole. Breaking down the bilipid membrane of a cell will quickly reveal the contribution that it makes to the cell's electrical activities.
Activation experiments also help to resolve the problems associated with bottom-up experiments, namely the problems of compensation and indirect effects. Both interference and stimulation experiments suffer from the worry that the behavior of the mechanism during the bottom-up intervention is different from the way that the intact and unmolested mechanism behaves. One can avoid the problem of contemporary responses by doing nothing that would damage the system or cause it to repair itself. One activates the system under its standard conditions, and one watches how the mechanism behaves intact.
Furthermore, one can check to see if stimulation experiments and lesion experiments have disturbed the mechanism through indirect effects by seeing whether the putative component is active when the mechanism is working in its normal conditions. Many of the critics of neuroimaging techniques, with whom I share a number of sympathies, forget that before neuroimaging was invented, there were always lingering doubts about how to interpret lesion and stimulation studies. One was always left wondering if the changes produced by intervening into the mechanism produced those changes in the same way that the mechanism works under standard, non-invasive, conditions. Imaging techniques allow one to watch the brain in action without such potentially destructive interference, and so help to alleviate some of these interpretive worries.
The main point is that none of these experimental strategies is alone sufficient to establish that a component is constitutively relevant to an effect. However, taken together, these experimental strategies are powerful in the search for relevant components. The mutual manipulability account is designed to make this relationship more explicit.
I want to be clear about the limits of my conjecture. My claim is that to establish that X's φ-ing is relevant to S's ψ-ing it is sufficient that one be able to manipulate S's ψ-ing by intervening to change X's φ-ing (by stimulating or inhibiting) and that one be able to manipulate X's φ-ing by manipulating S's ψ-ing.
To establish that a component is irrelevant, it is sufficient to show that one cannot manipulate S's ψ-ing by intervening to change X's φ-ing and that one cannot manipulate X's φ-ing by manipulating S's ψ-ing. The complexities in the componency relationship make it difficult to say more about the intermediate cases in
which only one half of the mutual manipulability account is satisfied. What to say in such cases, I suspect, depends on details peculiar to given experiments that admit of no general formulation. Nevertheless, the mutual manipulability approach is a suitable starting point for an account of constitutive relevance, and I argued that it captures many of the norms implicit in the practice of assessing interlevel relationships in the sciences.
Let us now return to the issue of background conditions and see how a manipulationist approach might be used to locate them outside the boundaries of mechanisms. Part of the problem, of course, is that background conditions are relevant to the behavior of the mechanism as a whole. Nonetheless, there are objective considerations that allow one to locate them as in some other sense outside of the boundaries of the mechanism proper.
Sometimes mere background conditions are identified by conjoining interference and stimulation strategies. Intervening to inhibit a background condition (B's) φ-ing might inhibit S's ψ-ing, but one cannot stimulate S's ψ-ing by stimulating B's φ-ing. For example, although interfering with the heart interferes with word-stem completion, one cannot produce word-stem completion by stimulating the heart. Second, sometimes background conditions can be ruled out on the basis of activation experiments.
Although one can interfere with S's ψ-ing by interfering with background condition B's φ-ing, at least in many cases one cannot alter B's φ-ing by manipulating S's ψ-ing. For example, lesioning the heart might produce deficits in word-stem completion, but engaging a subject in word-stem completion will not change the behavior of the heart (except under torturous word-stem completion tasks outside of the range of conditions relevant in the implied context of the request for explanation).
Third, the effects of interfering with background conditions tend to be non-specific, that is, they affect many phenomena besides the one under study. Researchers learned, for example, that the lateral hypothalamus is not a hunger center by recognizing that the hypothalamic lesions prevent the animals from doing most of the things that animals do. Lesions to the heart would impair not only word-stem completion but also everything else distinctive of a living organism.
Finally, the effects of interventions that change background conditions on the behaviors of mechanisms are often unsubtle. One cannot reliably produce subtle changes in word-stem completion by even arbitrarily subtle interventions to change the heart; interventions on the heart that have any effect seem to have switch-like effects. Slowing the heart, for example, will have no effect up to a threshold beyond which word-stem completion rapidly plummets. One who truly understood word-stem completion, however, if provided with the appropriate tools (a sizeable if), would be able to intervene into the mechanism to manipulate subtly the mechanism's output. 7 Criteria of this sort provide an objective basis on which to distinguish background conditions from components in a mechanism.
Conclusion.
To conclude, I argue that neither the causal-mechanical view nor the once-received covering law account of explanation currently has an adequate approach to constitutive explanatory relevance. Such an account is required to distinguish good mechanistic and reductive explanations from bad because good explanations are those that include all and only the relevant components. Such an account is also required to delineate the boundaries of mechanisms, and so to say what a mechanism is. My proposal is that relationships of manipulability should replace the requirement of derivability as a regulative ideal for constitutive explanations in neuroscience. One need not be able to derive the phenomenon from a description of the mechanism. Rather, one needs to know how the phenomenon would change under a variety of interventions into its parts and how the parts change when one intervenes to change the phenomenon. When one possesses explanations of this sort, one is in a position to make predictions about how the system will behave under a variety of conditions. More importantly, however, when one possesses explanations of this sort, one knows how to intervene into the mechanism in order to produce regular changes in the phenomenon (and vice versa). The fine details of this view of explanation remain to be
